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This study analyzes the relationship between the increase in the maximum amount of deposits 
per bank per person covered by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC hereafter) in 
2010 from $100,000 to $250,000 and the risk-taking willingness of banks in the US. The results 
show that moral hazard and the riskiness of banks decreased after the introduction of the higher 
coverage amount. 
The FDIC was a bearer of hopes upon its introduction: “It is your problem no less than it is 
mine. Together we cannot fail” (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 1933). With these 
words president Franklin D. Roosevelt announced the foundation of the FDIC in 1933 after the 
banking crisis in the US wiped out thousands of banks in the beginning of the 1930s. The FDIC 
became the first nationwide deposit insurance scheme in the world. Nowadays, deposit insur-
ance is a widely adopted tool to ensure banking stability and was even part of multiple interna-
tional regulatory bodies’ best practices such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF hereafter) 
and the World Bank (Anginer and Demirgüç-Kunt 2018). Ten years after the global financial 
crisis (GFC hereafter), deposit insurance is still heavily discussed due to the shortcomings that 
became apparent during the very same crisis. Even though deposit insurance can prevent bank 
runs, it is well established in literature that it also fosters moral hazard and excessive risk taking 
among insured banks. Especially the increase of the maximum covered amount of deposits per 
customer per bank in the US from $100,000 to $250,000 during the GFC to re-establish confi-
dence in the banking system has raised concerns about increased risk-taking incentives coming 
from a larger safety net. This increase was made permanent on July 21, 2010 by the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (see SEC. 335. Permanent Increase in 
Deposit and Share Insurance) (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 2011). While there is a 
large amount of evidence before and during the GFC, to the best of my knowledge, this paper 
is the first to examine the long-term effects of the change of the deposit insurance design after 
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the GFC. For that reason, this paper investigates the development of the risk-taking willingness 
of US-American banks before and after the permanent increase of the maximum amount cov-
ered by the FDIC, leading to the following research question:  
Is there a significant positive relationship between the permanent increase of the maximum 
amount covered by the FDIC and the risk-taking willingness of banks? 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of the theoretical 
background of deposit insurance, existing literature, and the development of deposit insurance 
in the US. Section 3 describes the construction of the sample and variables and methodology 
used. Section 4 describes the empirical results. Finally, section 5 discusses the research’s limi-
tations and practical implications, while section 6 concludes. 
2. Theoretical Framework and Literature Review 
2.1. Theory of Deposit Insurance 
Financial institutions and in particular banks serve a special purpose in the economy in provid-
ing services to customers with short-term and long-term needs. In the so-called maturity trans-
formation, banks transform short-term deposits into long-term loans (Anginer and Demirgüç-
Kunt 2018). However, as these long-term investments are illiquid in nature, this transformation 
process makes banks vulnerable to large waves of withdrawals of customer deposits due to 
consumption needs or income shocks. Even though inherently unstable, the maturity transfor-
mation serves the economic well-being of a given economy (Anginer and Demirgüç-Kunt 
2018). If, however, deposit withdrawals of multiple depositors coincide, banks can run into 
trouble serving the needs of their customers without having to interrupt some or all illiquid 
long-term investments. The liquidation of these projects, though, can often lead to significant 
economic losses, which can drive a bank into insolvency. If depositors learn or only hear rumors 
about their bank running into liquidity problems, it is only reasonable to run to the bank in order 
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to withdraw deposits as customers are served on a first-come, first-serve basis and whoever 
comes last might not receive anything. This makes the rumor of a bank’s illiquidity a self-
fulfilling prophecy. Similarly, a decline in the value of assets that a bank holds can cause cus-
tomers to withdraw deposits at the same time due to the same reason mentioned before (I. 
Fischer 1912, Bryant 1980, Gorton 1988, Allen and Gale 2000). 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) realized first that the short-term, unpredictable nature of demand 
deposits combined with the typical high leverage of banks creates a bad Nash equilibrium, 
which can lead to even solvent banks experiencing runs that result in significant economic 
losses. The authors figured that depositors need to be credibly convinced that a bank run will 
not occur. In that case, only depositors with real liquidity needs will withdraw their money, 
which can be easily served by the bank’s cash reserves. In their model, deposit insurance elim-
inates the bad Nash equilibrium, in which everybody runs, as depositors are convinced that they 
will receive their money from the deposit insurance fund if the bank fails. However, this idea 
relies on the assumptions that depositors see the deposit insurance as credible and that the de-
posit insurance is covering the entire amount deposited by each customer. If fulfilled, deposit 
insurance prevents the costly liquidation of long-term investments and saves the bank from 
insolvency (Marini 2003). The notion that deposit insurance can ensure bank stability is sup-
ported by several subsequent studies (Hazlett 1997, Chang and Velasco 2001, Green and Lin 
2003). The most important extension of the Diamond-Dybvig model, however, is the introduc-
tion of investments in risky assets by banks as a consequence of the deposit guarantee from 
insurance. Moral hazard in the form of higher risk-taking willingness by insured banks resulting 
from the knowledge of having the coverage of a safety net was subject to most of the later 
literature (Calomiris 1989, Cooper and Ross 2002). These extensions made the need for design 
features that would minimize moral hazard obvious. 
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Design features can include a reasonable determination of the maximum amount of covered 
deposits, the type of covered deposits, and the type of institutions covered by the scheme. More-
over, the choice of fund contribution principle can be a crucial design feature to limit moral 
hazard (Anginer and Demirgüç-Kunt 2018). In addition, robust supervision and further regula-
tion such as additional capital requirements can curb risk-taking behaviors stemming from de-
posit insurance (Cooper and Ross 2002). Here central banks in their role as lender of last resort 
play an important complementary role in providing liquidity to banks (Marini 2003), while 
deposit insurance ensures that each depositor receives their money. If Bagehot’s principle is 
being followed and if the central bank only lends to illiquid but solvent banks, this should pre-
vent depositors from running on solvent banks (S. Fischer 1999, Kahn and Santos 2005, 
Ngalawa, Tchana and Viegi 2016). As in practice, deposit insurance schemes are always under-
funded, their success depends crucially on their ex-ante credibility. Moreover, depositors that 
are not covered by deposit insurance play a crucial role in monitoring banks (Anginer and 
Demirgüç-Kunt 2018). 
2.2. Benefits of Deposit Insurance 
Due to today’s interdependency of the banking world through interbank lending and risk-shar-
ing contracts, bank runs on an individual bank can easily spread to the entire banking sector 
causing multiple banks to become insolvent (Anginer and Demirgüç-Kunt 2018). This conta-
gion can cause serious problems for the real economy as banks are still the major financing 
source for households and companies. A disruption on the financing side can cause lower pro-
duction and output in the real economy as well as delays in the payment system and thus lead 
to higher unemployment, which in turn increases long-term costs of social benefits. Besides 
these indirect costs of bank failures, taxpayer support (such as liquidity injections and bailouts) 
can lead to direct costs of bank insolvency (Hoggarth, Reis and Saporta 2002, Smith 2002). 
These costs can be prevented by effective deposit insurance. 
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The effects of deposit insurance systems have been widely tested in empirical literature. As 
proposed by the Diamond-Dybvig model, deposit insurance should mainly reduce the likeli-
hood of bank runs. This effect can also be found in empirical studies. For instance, using ac-
count-level balances of a US bank that failed in the GFC, Martin, Puri and Ufier (2017) find 
that deposit insurance, temporary or permanent, reduces the outflows from deposit accounts in 
times of distress and improves the bank’s deposit stability, while uninsured investors withdraw 
deposits quickly. Moreover, Angkinand (2009) investigated the relationship between banking 
regulation and the severity of banking crises, using data regarding 47 crises in 35 countries 
between the 1970s and 2003. She finds that countries, which have comprehensive deposit in-
surance enacted, have lower overall output costs associated with crises. Findings regarding an 
increase in bank stability from deposit insurance could also be confirmed by Chernykh and Cole 
(2011) and DeLong and Saunders (2011). 
In addition to reducing bank runs, deposit insurance usually has the effect of providing regula-
tions for resolving problematic banks. These regulations can reduce the economic costs of for-
bearance, in which insolvent banks are allowed to keep operating (Pyle 1986, Lucas and 
McDonald 2006). When banks are insolvent, they have incentives to take on excessive risk in 
order to retain the value of lost assets. This risk-taking willingness is later significantly increas-
ing the bank’s resolution costs. Moreover, deposit insurance can increase incentives for politi-
cians and regulators for effective supervision. Kane (1989) generally finds unwillingness 
among regulators and politicians to enforce effective supervision. Especially politicians want 
banks to lend more to the real economy in order to increase the nation’s wealth during their 
political term and not restrict them by regulations. When deposit insurance is introduced, how-
ever, it opens the possibility that ultimately the fund and therefore taxpayers have to bear the 
costs of a failing bank. This increases the incentives to enact effective regulation and supervi-
sion of banks.  
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2.3. Costs of Deposit Insurance 
As mentioned previously, besides having the positive effect of reducing bank runs, deposit in-
surance also bears the risk of increasing moral hazard on both sides of a bank’s balance sheet, 
i.e. on the asset side in risky investments by banks, but also on the liability side among deposi-
tors. This may consequently lead to bank instability (Calomiris 1990, Gennotte and Pyle 1991). 
For banks, the guarantee of a deposit insurance to help out in case of failing removes market 
discipline and thus creates the incentive of investing in riskier assets. The socialization of pos-
sible losses leads to the search for higher profits in riskier investments that can be internalized 
by the bank. Additionally, the knowledge of depositors to be insured by the guarantee scheme 
significantly reduces their incentive to monitor the financial condition of their bank. This leads 
to the consequence that riskier investments are not compensated with higher interest rates for 
depositors as they fail to effectively monitor the bank, which again incentivizes banks to invest 
in riskier loans or increase their leverage (Anginer and Demirgüç-Kunt 2018). 
The above mentioned effects have been found multiple times in academic literature. For in-
stance, in conducting a natural experiment by using the introduction of deposit insurance in 
eight states in the US between 1908 and 1917, Calomiris and Jaremski (2019) find that deposits 
were attracted away from uninsured to insured banks. They also find that market discipline 
imposed by depositors was removed for insured banks, but continued to restrict risk-taking of 
uninsured banks. Furthermore, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) find that the 
introduction of explicit deposit insurance increases the likelihood of having a banking crisis in 
a country and increases bank instability, which they infer on increased moral hazard. With 
regards to increasing risk by more leverage, Nier and Baumann (2006) as well as Fonseca and 
González (2010) observe that the introduction of deposit insurance reduces the capital ratio of 
banks. Moreover, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) find that the adoption of deposit 
insurance decreases the correlation between deposit interest rates and changes in bank risk. The 
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previously mentioned findings regarding increased risk-taking and reduced depositor 
monitoring were confirmed by multiple other studies and over different countries and regions 
(Wheelock and Wilson 1995, Cull, Senbet and Sorge 2001, Laeven 2002, Carapella and Di 
Giorgio 2004, Ioannidou and Penas 2010, Karas, Pyle and Schoors 2013, Bergbrant, et al. 2014, 
Gropp, Gruendl and Guettler 2014, Calomiris and Chen 2016). Also previously mentioned stud-
ies that found positive effects of deposit insurance, saw an increase in risk-taking willingness 
of banks (Chernykh and Cole 2011, DeLong and Saunders 2011). 
In short, the net effect of deposit insurance depends on whether the benefits can outweigh the 
mentioned costs. Anginer, Demirgüç-Kunt and Zhu (2014) examine the effect of deposit 
insurance on banks’ standalone risk as well as an individual bank’s contribution to systemic 
risk before and during the GFC. They find that in the build-up to the crisis, deposit insurance 
has negative effects on the risk-taking willingness of banks. However, in times of distress 
during the crisis, they observe that countries with more generous deposit insurance schemes 
experience less risk-taking of their banks and higher systemic stability. Nonetheless, they close 
that the overall effect of deposit insurance is negative. This conclusion is supported by the 
results of Ngalawa, Tchana and Viegi (2016), who find that the costs of moral hazard outweigh 
the benefits on bank stability. 
2.4. Deposit Insurance in the US 
Deposit insurance schemes were first introduced in the US in 1829 as a safety fund for banks 
operating in New York. After several failed implementations on state-wide levels in the 1910s 
(Calomiris 1989), the FDIC was established in 1933 as a reaction to the failure of thousands of 
banks as a consequence of the Great Depression (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 2017). 
The adoption of a federal deposit insurance scheme came despite the rejection of over 50 
proposals since the 1880s as they had been regarded as “socially undesirable” and lobbied for 
by banks (Calomiris and White 1994), but the Great Depression changed the politicians’ 
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mindsets. The early introduction of deposit insurance in the US was due to its unique unit-
banking structure (Calomiris and Jaremski 2016) and other countries started adopting deposit 
insurance systems only in the 1960s. The increase in the usage of deposit insurance schemes 
around the world is partly due to the inclusion of guarantee systems on retail deposits as a 
recommendation for sound stability measures by international regulatory bodies such as the 
World Bank, IMF, and the European Union and partly due to the GFC as financial crises make 
the adoption of deposit insurance more likely because of external political pressure (Demirgüç-
Kunt, Kane and Laeven 2008). As of 2018, 115 countries use some form of explicit deposit 
guarantee scheme according to the Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey conducted by the 
World Bank (Anginer, Bertay, et al. 2019). 
Despite having been planned only as temporary measure, the FDIC quickly became a permanent 
feature of the US banking regulation that covers more or less all deposits today either by explicit 
or implict deposit insurance (Calomiris and Jaremski 2016). The FDIC is proud that since its 
beginnings “no depositor has lost a single cent of insured funds as a result of a failure” (Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation 2017). The coverage limit per depositor per bank was raised 
multiple times in the history of the FDIC: from $40,000 to $100,000 in 1980 and first only 
temporarily in 2008 and later perminantely to $250,000 in 2010 to restore confidence in the 
banking system during the GFC (Anginer and Demirgüç-Kunt 2018). The maximum amount 
covered by the fund as well as the decision on which institutions and which types of deposits 
are covered provide a tool for the FDIC to manage moral hazard. In addition, the FDIC uses a 
form of risk-based pricing to determine the contributions per bank to the fund. This causes 




3. Data and Empirical Methodology 
3.1. Sample 
The sample consists of all private and publicly traded US-American commercial, savings, and 
cooperative banks covered by Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis database for the years 2007 to 2018 
excluding credit unions as these are generally not covered by the FDIC. In addition to the data 
obtained from Orbis, for publicly traded banks stock information from CSRP has been used. 
Orbis database summarizes and provides detailed bank-level information regarding balance 
sheet and income statement data for private and publicly traded companies. Data from Orbis 
has been downloaded via the Wharton Research Database as this platform provides the possi-
bility to gather data from 2007 on. The data covers 4,947 out of 5,280 banks that are currently 
insured by the FDIC. CSRP provides daily and monthly stock returns for the US-American 
market. The final sample is a panel dataset consisting of 4,947 banks and branches, of which 
1,008 are publicly traded or belong to a parent bank corporation that is publicly traded. 
3.2. Bank Level Variables 
Building on the empirical work of Anginer, Demirgüç-Kunt and Zhu (2014) and therefore also 
on the work of Laeven and Levine (2008), the z-score1 is used as a measure of standalone bank 
risk. The z-score is the sum of the mean of the return on assets (ROA hereafter) and the capital-
asset ratio (CAR hereafter) divided by the standard deviation of ROA (see Equation 1). This 
measure is used to find the distance of a bank to insolvency in standard deviations (Roy 1952), 
i.e. the situation, in which losses have fully depleted equity. Thereby, the probability of 




            (1) 
 
1 It is important to note that this z-score is fundamentally different from the Altman z-score developed by Ed-
ward Altman (1968) and should not be confused. 
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A higher z-score indicates that a bank is more stable. To ensure consistency and comparability 
with existing literature, the natural logarithm of z-scores is used. For readability, the term z-
score will be used for the natural logarithm of the z-score in the following. Even though the z-
score can only be as good as the data reported by the financial institutions as it is based purely 
on accounting data (World Bank 2016), this measure offers the possibility to calculate risk for 
institutions, which do not over more advanced market data. Hence, looking at the large number 
of private banks in the sample, z-score is preferred over similar measures such as Distance to 
Default. 
Additionally, for publicly traded banks a second measure of standalone bank risk is calculated 
with the help of stock return volatilities (Volatility hereafter). Volatility is thereby calculated as 
the standard deviation of daily stock returns in a given fiscal year. A higher Volatility indicates 
a higher standalone bank risk. 
Following Anginer, Demirgüç-Kunt and Zhu (2014) again, for each year and each bank also 
bank size (natural logarithm of total assets), leverage (total liabilities divided by total assets), 
provisions (loan loss provisions divided by total assets), reliance on deposits for funding 
(deposits divided by total assets), and profitability (ROA) are computed as control variables. 
Moreover, the given years are divided by creating a period variable that is set equal to 0 for the 
years before the FDIC increase, 2007-2009, which coincides with the GFC, and equal to 1 for 
the period after the FDIC increase, for the years 2010-2018, which is also the post-crisis period. 
3.3. Systemic Stability Measure 
More recent literature has stressed the importance of a bank’s contribution to the overall risk of 
a financial system rather than merely the standalone risk of an individual bank. Hereby, the 
correlation between the risk-taking behavior of banks is of interest (Anginer, Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Zhu 2014). For this reason, following the expected capital shortfall model by Acharya, 
Engle and Richardson (2012), the Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES hereafter) is computed. 
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The MES is the expected loss a shareholder of a financial instution would suffer in a substantial 




𝑚 < 𝐶)           (2) 
In Equation 2, 𝑅𝑡
𝑖 is bank i’s stock return and 𝑅𝑡
𝑚 is the return of the market index at the same 
time t. The aforementioned substantial market downturn is indicated by a market decline below 
a certain threshold 𝐶, thus defining the downturn as 𝑅𝑡
𝑚 < 𝐶. Following Anginer, Demirgüç-
Kunt and Zhu (2014), this threshold is defined as the market index’s return at its lowest 5% 
over the previous one year of available return data. Thus, a lower MES indicates higher systemic 
risk (Anginer, Demirgüç-Kunt and Zhu 2014). As before, daily stock return data from CSRP is 
used. For the market index data, the Nasdaq Composite index is taken as a proxy for the 
development of the US-American economy. Price data for the Nasdaq Composite index, from 
which returns are then calculated, is downloaded from Bloomberg. 
3.4. Empirical Methodology 
The permanent increase of the maximum amount covered by the FDIC in 2010 raises the 
question if the risk-taking willingness of banks was increased by having a larger safety net for 
failing institutions. Following this thought, intuitively the permanent raise should have a 
significant negative impact on an average bank’s z-score (Hypothesis 1), a significant positive 
impact on the Volatility (Hypothesis 2), and a significant negative impact on bank systemic risk 
(Hypothesis 3). The effects on these dependent bank risk variables are tested with the help of 
linear regressions in the following section. Stata was used for data processing and analysis. 
4. Results 
4.1. Summary Statistics 
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the tested variables. The z-score of an average bank in 
the sample is 3.605, while the Volatility of an average publicly traded bank in the sample is 
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0.021 (i.e. 2.1%) and the MES is -0.014 (i.e. -1.4%). Moreover, an average bank in the sample 
has a bank size (logarithm of total assets) of 19.229 and a leverage ratio of 0.889 (i.e. 88.9%).  
Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
 Variable  N  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
 Log (z-score) 45,209 3.605 .89 -2.987 6.383 
 Volatility 3,867 .021 .014 .006 .225 
 MES 3,867 -.014 .009 -.055 .013 
 Log (Total Assets) 45,276 19.229 1.089 16.928 23.857 
 Leverage 45,276 .889 .044 0 1.064 
 Provisions 45,262 .003 .006 -.07 .306 
 Deposits 45,266 .864 .057 0 1.044 
 ROA 45,276 .008 .012 -.14 .665 
 
The table reports the summary statistics of the variables used in this paper. The sample consists of 4,947 banks in 
the US over the time period 2007-2018, using yearly financial statement and balance sheet data. Of these banks, 
1,008 are publicly traded or belong to a parent bank corporation that is publicly traded. Log (z-score) is the natural 
logarithm of the sum of the mean of ROA and CAR divided by the standard deviation of ROA. Volatility is the 
stock return volatility of publicly traded banks, calculated as the standard deviation of daily stock returns in one 
fiscal year. MES is the average return of publicly traded banks on days when the Nasdaq Composite index’ return, 
as a proxy for the US-American economy, is at its lowest 5% over a given year. Log (Total Assets) is the natural 
logarithm of total assets and corresponds to the bank’s size. Leverage is total liabilities divided by total assets. 
Provisions is loan loss provisions divided by total assets. Deposits is total deposits divided by total assets. ROA is 
net income divided by total assets. 
 
Table 2 
Sub-Sample Comparison of Means 
Crisis Period  
     N   Mean   Std.Dev.   Min   Max 
 Log (z-score) 4,800 3.446 .976 -2.157 6.383 
 Volatility 326 .045 .021 .009 .164 
 MES 326 -.022 .017 -.055 .013 
 Log (Total Assets) 4,845 18.98 1.025 16.933 23.756 
 Leverage 4,845 .893 .043 .158 1.053 
 Provisions 4,842 .007 .01 -.07 .198 
 Deposits 4,842 .86 .053 0 1.044 
 ROA 4,845 .004 .013 -.14 .135 
 
Post-Crisis Period  
 Log (z-score) 40,409 3.624 .877 -2.987 6.212 
 Volatility 3,541 .019 .011 .006 .225 
 MES 3,541 -.014 .008 -.034 .005 
 Log (Total Assets) 40,431 19.259 1.093 16.928 23.857 
 Leverage 40,431 .888 .044 0 1.064 
 Provisions 40,420 .002 .005 -.062 .306 
 Deposits 40,424 .864 .057 0 .999 
 ROA 40,431 .009 .012 -.107 .665 
The table reports mean values for Log (z-score), Volatility, and MES as well as for the mentioned control variables 
for two sub-sample periods, before and after the increase of the maximum covered amount by the FDIC. Defini-




The values for z-score, Volatility, systemic risk (MES), and leverage ratio are comparable to 
those of Anginer, Demirgüç-Kunt and Zhu (2014). In addition to the shown summary statistics, 
Table 2 provides a sub-sample comparison of the means of the explained statistics by period. 
The results suggest that the z-score is higher in the post-crisis period than in the crisis period, 
contradicting the intuition that forms the basis for Hypothesis 1. Also, Volatility of publicly 
traded banks is lower in the post-crisis period in comparison to the crisis period. Likewise, the 
systemic risk measured by MES is also less negative after the permanent increase of the maxi-
mum covered amount. 
4.2. Hypotheses Testing 
To be able to confirm the intuition of the sub-sample comparison in the previous section that 
there are significant differences between the means of the dependent variables in the two time 
periods, a statistical test is performed. The conducting of a Doornik-Hansen test and a Shapiro-
Wilk test for normality both yield that neither of the three main variables of interest (Log (z-
score), Volatility, and MES) are normally distributed. Therefore, the comparison between the 
means of either variable in the two defined periods is performed with the help of a Mann-Whit-
ney U Test. Here, a nonparametric test is chosen as the true distributions of the variables’ values 
are not known. For each variable, 𝐻0 is defined as follows in Equation 3, where 𝑣𝑎𝑟 is replaced 
with the respective dependent variable of interest: 
𝐻0 = 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 == 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑) = 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 == 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑)   (3) 
The results displayed in Table 3 show that 𝐻0 needs to be rejected for Log (z-score), Volatility, 
and MES as the differences in means for these variables are all significant at the 99%-level. 
This means, that a significant change has occurred between the two observed periods. Hence, 







Mann-Whitney U Test Results 
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The table reports the results for the Mann-Whitney U Test conducted for all three dependent variables of interest 
(Log (z-score), Volatility, and MES). The rank sum for the crisis period is shown in column rank sum1 and the 
rank sum for the post-crisis period is provided in column rank sum2. The expected values per rank sum are dis-
played in brackets below the rank sum figure. Definitions for the variables are provided in Table 1. 
 
4.2.1. Bank Risk 
First, the impact of the permanent change in the maximum amount covered by the FDIC from 
$100,000 to $250,000 in 2010 on the z-score of the sample banks is tested. As mentioned before, 
in theory this change could create a larger incentive for moral hazard and thus increased risk-
taking (in the form of a lower z-score) due to a larger safety net that would benefit banks if they 
are failing. In order to test the relationship, ordinary least squares (OLS) is used for the follow-
ing regression specification: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑧𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛺 × 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽1 × 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡     (4) 
The dependent variable in the regression in Equation 4 is bank i’s risk at time t in the form of 
the z-score (𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑧𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡). The independent variable of interest is 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡, which is a variable 
that takes 1 for the years after the maximum amount covered by the FDIC was increased to 
$250,000, and 0 for the years before, i.e. 2007-2009. Furthermore, control variables that can 
affect risk are included in the regression. These control variables are all lagged by one year to 
prevent any reverse causality problem. 
The regression results can be found in Table 4. The coefficent of the variable 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡 shows 
that the permanent increase in the maximum amount covered per customer per account from 
$100,000 to $250,000 has a significant positive impact on the bank z-score, refuting Hypothesis 
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1. A possible reason for this result is that 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡 not only incorporates the changes in the 
maximum covered by the FDIC, but also other measures such as increased requirements for 
capital ratios due to new regulation or an expansive monetary policy by the FED after the GFC. 
In their totality, those measures may have a positive effect on the risk-taking willingness of 
banks. However, the effect of each single one is utterly difficult to differentiate. This problem 
will be discussed more in depth in Section 5. 
Table 4 
Regression Log (z-score) with Robust SEs 
 Log (z-score)  Coef.  St.Err.  t-value  p-value [95% Conf  Interval]  Sig 
 Log (Total Assets) 0.102 0.004 25.31 0.000 0.094 0.110 *** 
 Leverage -3.619 0.301 -12.02 0.000 -4.210 -3.029 *** 
 Provisions -38.835 2.176 -17.85 0.000 -43.100 -34.570 *** 
 Deposits 0.130 0.157 0.83 0.408 -0.178 0.438  
 ROA 4.887 1.873 2.61 0.009 1.215 8.559 *** 
 period 0.741 0.050 14.73 0.000 0.642 0.839 *** 
 Constant 4.107 0.257 16.01 0.000 3.604 4.610 *** 
 
Mean dependent var 3.614 SD dependent var  0.883 
R-squared  0.140 Number of obs   40,202 
F-test   376.754 Prob > F  0.000 
Akaike crit. (AIC) 98021.151 Bayesian crit. (BIC) 98081.363 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
The table reports the results of the regression described in Section 4.2.1. The sample consists of 4,947 banks in the 
US over the years 2007-2018. Definitions for variables are provided in Table 1. The standard errors of the coeffi-
cients have been adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
 
With regards to control variables, the results show that banks with higher leverage have higher 
risk. On the contrary, larger banks (Log(Total Assets)) are more stable. The same holds true for 
banks with higher loan loss provisions. Moreover, banks with higher profitability (ROA) show 
lower risk levels as well. The results for leverage, loan loss provisions and profitability confirm 
the findings by Anginer, Demirgüç-Kunt and Zhu (2014). The finding for the reliance on 
deposits for funding is not statistically significant. 
4.2.2. Stock Return Volatility 
As an additional measure, the impact of the permanent increase in the maximum amount cov-
ered by the FDIC on the Volatility of publicly traded US banks is tested. An increase in risk-
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taking willingness after the increase should be reflected by a higher Volatility. Again, the fol-
lowing regression specification is tested with the help of OLS: 
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛺 × 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽1 × 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡     (5) 
In Equation 5, 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable of the regression. As before, the regressor 
of main interest is 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡 and the impact of the aforementioned control variables lagged by 
one year will be tested. 
Table 5 
Regression Volatility with Robust SEs  
 Volatility  Coef.  St.Err. t-value  p-value  [95% 
Conf 
 Interval]  Sig 
 Log (Total Assets) -0.001 0.000 -8.23 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 *** 
 Leverage 0.014 0.007 1.87 0.062 -0.001 0.028 * 
 Provisions 0.334 0.058 5.70 0.000 0.219 0.448 *** 
 Deposits -0.002 0.005 -0.39 0.698 -0.011 0.007  
 ROA -0.028 0.019 -1.50 0.135 -0.065 0.009  
 period -0.031 0.004 -7.07 0.000 -0.040 -0.023 *** 
 Constant 0.060 0.007 8.68 0.000 0.047 0.074 *** 
 
Mean dependent var 0.019 SD dependent var  0.011 
R-squared  0.117 Number of obs   3,416 
F-test   28.007 Prob > F  0.000 
Akaike crit. (AIC) -21226.958 Bayesian crit. (BIC) -21184.004 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
The table reports the results of the regression described in Section 4.2.2. The sample consists of 1,008 banks in the 
US over the years 2007-2018. Definitions for variables are provided in Table 1. The standard errors of the coeffi-
cients have been adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
 
Table 5 provides the results of the regression. The coefficient for 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡 shows that the per-
manent increase of the maximum amount covered by the FDIC has a significant negative impact 
on the Volatility of publicly traded US banks, i.e. decreasing stock return volatility and thereby 
refuting Hypothesis 2. In economic terms, the increase in the maximum coverage amount by 
$150,000 led to 3.1 percentage points less volatility of an average bank’s stock returns. How-
ever, as mentioned before, it is difficult to attribute this effect solely to the changes made by 
the FDIC. With regards to control variables, banks with higher leverage and banks with higher 
loan loss provisions also have higher Volatility, although the observation for leverage is only 
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significant at a 90%-confidence level. Bank size has a significant negative but rather limited 
effect on Volatility. The effects of reliance on deposits for funding and profitability are not 
significant. 
4.2.3. Systemic Risk 
Furthermore, the impact of the permanent increase in the maximum amount covered by the 
FDIC on the systemic risk of the sample banks is tested. An increase in a bank’s systemic risk 
should be reflected in a lower MES. Again, OLS is used to test the following regression speci-
fication: 
𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛺 × 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽1 × 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡      (6) 
In Equation 6, bank i’s Marginal Expected Shortfall (𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡) is the dependent variable. Once 
again, 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡 is the regressor of interest and the impact of the above mentioned control vari-
ables lagged by one year is tested, respectively. 
Table 6 
Regression MES with Robust SEs  
 MES  Coef.  St.Err. t-value  p-value  [95% Conf Interval]  Sig 
 Log (Total Assets) -0.001 0.000 -10.36 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 *** 
 Leverage 0.020 0.005 3.70 0.000 0.009 0.030 *** 
 Provisions -0.120 0.032 -3.72 0.000 -0.183 -0.057 *** 
 Deposits -0.022 0.003 -8.78 0.000 -0.027 -0.017 *** 
 ROA -0.072 0.015 -4.95 0.000 -0.101 -0.044 *** 
 period 0.005 0.003 1.48 0.139 -0.001 0.011  
 Constant 0.008 0.006 1.44 0.149 -0.003 0.020  
 
Mean dependent var -0.014 SD dependent var  0.008 
R-squared  0.050 Number of obs   3,416 
F-test   30.997 Prob > F  0.000 
Akaike crit. (AIC) -23452.279 Bayesian crit. (BIC) -23409.326 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
The table reports the results of the regression described in Section 4.5. The sample consists of 1,008 banks in the 
US over the years 2007-2018. Definitions for variables are provided in Table 1. The standard errors of the coeffi-
cients have been adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
 
Table 6 provides the results of the regression. The findings for 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡 suggest that the per-
manent increase of the maximum amount covered by the FDIC does not have a significant 
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impact on bank systemic risk, i.e. refuting Hypothesis 3. Given this finding it can be inferred 
that increasing the maximum coverage amount of a deposit guarantee scheme has no effect on 
the systemic risk of insured banks. Regarding control variables, the effect of an increase in MES 
holds true for banks with higher leverage ratio. Moreover, larger banks (though only margin-
ally), banks with higher profitability, banks with more reliance on deposits for funding, and 
banks with higher loan loss provisions have a lower MES, i.e. higher systemic risk. 
5. Discussion 
5.1. Limitations 
The results of the analysis show that the period has a significant impact on the development of 
z-score and Volatility for the average bank of the sample. However, no signifcant impact on the 
systemic risk of a bank measured by MES could be identified. 
The main limitation of the study results from the permanent increase in the maximum amount 
covered by the FDIC coinciding with the end of the GFC. This makes it difficult to differentiate 
the effects of the crisis itself from the effects of the change in regulation by the FDIC. 
Integrating control variables for the impact of new regulation after the GFC by including the 
impact of higher capital ratios (in the form of Total Capital Ratio) and a more expansive 
monetary policy that resulted in less volatile financial markets and lower risk premia (in the 
form of the VIX2) led to problems of multicollinearity in the regression. Conducting hierachical 
regressions integrating more control variables with every hierarchical step in the regression, 
however, showed that the meaningfulness (i.e. the R-squared) of the model for z-score is the 
highest when Total Capital Ratio and VIX are not integrated. When observing the results for 
Volatility and MES, they show that Total Capital Ratio does not have significant impact on the 
development of those two risk measures. Moreover, even though VIX has a significant impact, 
 
2 Data for the VIX has been obtained from Bloomberg. 
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the coefficient is minimal. Hence, regressions have been calculated without incorporating Total 
Capital Ratio or VIX. The coefficents of the hierachical regressions for z-score, Volatility, and 
MES, their significance as well as the R-squared of each regression can be found in Appendix 
A. Nonetheless, this leads to the conclusion that the observed changes in the dependent variables 
can not solely be attributed to the FDIC’s change in the maximum amount covered. Hence, all 
changes in regulation and monetary policy after the GFC have to be interpreted in their totality 
in the independent variable 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡. 
In addition, results are weakened by comparing merely three crisis years to a post-crisis period 
of nine years. This is limiting the meaningfulness of the crisis period results as means of nine 
years are representing the population better than values of merely three years. Also, for some 
banks, data is only available after 2008, creating a shorter time line for these institutions. 
Excluding the year 2010 completely, as the permanent increase of the maximum amount 
covered by the FDIC’s deposit insurance has been enacted in the middle of the year, yields 
similar results in terms of coefficients and significance compared to keeping 2010 in the sample. 
Hence, for the sake of having a larger sample size, 2010 was kept as part of the post-crisis 
period sample. 
5.2. Practical Implications 
The results of the multiple regressions have shown that the independent variable 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡 has 
a significant impact on the standalone bank risk in the form of z-score and Volatility, leading 
to a higher bank stability and less stock return volatility. Due to the previously discussed 
limitations of the research design, however, these results can not solely be attributed to the 
increase in the maximum amount covered by the FDIC from $100,000 to $250,000 in 2010. 
The introduction of multiple regulations such as higher required capital ratios and a more 
expansive monetary policy after the GFC coinciding with FDIC changes and the apparent 
interdepency between those adaptions make it difficult to attribute the observed changes in bank 
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stability to a single factor. Hence, at this point, the influences of the aforementioned factors 
need to be analyzed in their totality. What can be infered from the findings is that after the GFC 
there has indeed occured an improvement in the standalone stability of banks in the US. Which 
factors had prime importance on this development need to be analyzed in a more granular study. 
6. Conclusions 
The permanent increase of the maximum amount covered by the FDIC in 2010 raised concerns 
among economists that a larger safety net would foster moral hazard and more risk-taking will-
ingness among banks in the US. For this reason, this study investigates whether there is a sig-
nificant positive relation between the aforementioned actions applied by the FDIC and the risk-
iness of financial institutions. Explicitly, the study tests whether the permanent raise has a 
significant negative impact on the z-score of the average bank in the sample (Hypothesis 1), a 
significant positive impact on the stock return volatility (Hypothesis 2), and a significant 
negative impact on bank systemic risk (Hypothesis 3). The study finds that the totality of 
changes in regulation and monetary policy after the GFC increased the z-score of the average 
bank in the sample after the crisis period, i.e. financial institutions actually became more stable. 
Moreover, after the permanent introduction of the higher maximum amount covered and other 
policy measures, the stock return volatility of the publicly traded banks in the sample decreased 
significantly. Thereby, all three hypotheses have been refuted by the results obtained from the 
regressions. Limitations in the reliability of these findings result from the introduction of the 
increased maximum coverage amount by the FDIC coinciding with the end of the GFC as well 
as several other changes in regulation such as the necessity of higher capital ratios (which 
mitigate moral hazard created by deposit insurance) and a more expansive monetary policy by 
the FED after the GFC. These influences on the risk-taking willingness of banks cannot be 
properly differentiated. Further research should focus on separating the effects of multiple 
regulation and monetary policy changes more clearly to analyze the true effect of the change in 
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the US deposit insurance scheme on banks’ risk-taking willigness. Moreover, research should 
try to confirm the obtained results with data from other countries; preferably countries, in which 
the introduction of a larger safety net does not coincide with the end of a financial crisis. 
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Appendix A: Hierarchical Regression 
Appendix A.1 
Regression Log(z-score) with Robust SEs  
Variable Model1  Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 
Period 0.18*** 0.85*** 0.86*** 0.76*** 0.76*** 0.74*** omitted omitted 
Log (Total Assets)  0.09*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 
Leverage   -4.14*** -3.97*** -4.03*** -3.12*** -7.63*** -7.92*** 
Provisions    -42.45*** -42.42*** -38.84*** -38.06*** -42.49*** 
Deposits     0.06 0.13 0.07 0.24 
ROA      4.89* 4.09* 4.07*** 
Total Capital Ratio       -0.04*** -0.04*** 
VIX        0.02*** 
Constant 3.45*** 0.99*** 4.41*** 4.48*** 4.48*** 4.11*** 8.95*** 8.59*** 
         
N 45,209 40,211 40,211 40,202 40,202 40,202 39,594 39,594 
R2 0.004 0.026 0.067 0.137 0.137 0.140 0.127 0.134 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Appendix A.2 
Regression Volatility with Robust SEs  
Variable Model1  Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 
Period -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** omitted omitted 
Log (Total Assets)  -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
Leverage   0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02** 0.01 0.04 0.04 
Provisions    0.35*** 0.35*** 0.33*** 0.32*** 0.15*** 
Deposits     -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 
ROA      -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
Total Capital Ratio       0.00 0.00 
VIX        0.00*** 
Constant 0.05*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.01 -0.02 
         
N 3,867 3,417 3,417 3,416 3,416 3,416 3,380 3,380 
R2 0.245 0.083 0.087 0.115 0.115 0.115 0.046 0.125 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Appendix A.3 
Regression MES with Robust SEs  
Variable Model1  Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 
Period 0.01*** 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 omitted omitted 
Log (Total Assets)  -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
Leverage   0.01*** 0.01*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.09 0.09 
Provisions    -0.06* -0.08** -0.12*** -0.13*** -0.08** 
Deposits     -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 
ROA      -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.07*** 
Total Capital Ratio       0.00 0.00 
VIX        -0.00*** 
Constant -0.02*** 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.06 -0.05 
         
N 3,867 3,417 3,417 3,416 3,416 3,416 3,380 3,380 
R2 0.060 0.023 0.027 0.029 0.040 0.048 0.049 0.059 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
